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MARIOS J. MONOPOLIS*
Weber v. U.S. Sterling Securities, Inc.: Contracting
the Liability Shield for Members of Delaware
Limited Liability Companies
IN WEBER V. US. STERLING SECURITIES, INC.,' THE SUPREME COURT of Connecticut
considered the limitations of liability for members of a Delaware limited liability
company ("LLC") who committed a tortious act in their official capacity.2 The
court held that members of a Delaware LLC are not statutorily shielded by Dela-
ware law from personal liability when they commit a tort in their official capacities
and can therefore be held liable for their tortious conduct? In so holding, the court
maintained judicial coherence and uniformity with other jurisdictions' decisions
regarding the personal liability of individual LLC members.' This holding flowed
both from proper interpretation and application of Delaware law and recognition
of Delaware's steady judicial contraction of the LLC liability shield.' The court's
decision is further consistent with other jurisdictions' interpretations of similarly
worded statutes and with basic principles of agency and corporation law.6 The im-
plicit refusal to attach personal liability under the common law doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil was proper; the court still reached the proper result without
exposing its decision to possible reversal and while remaining true to the statutory
language.7
I. THE CASE
In 2004, Aharon Weber filed a class-action lawsuit against U.S. Sterling Securities,
Inc., U.S. Sterling Capital Corporation, Michelle Orr, Shawn Orr, and Retail Relief,
LLC ("Defendants") in the Superior Court of Connecticut Weber alleged that, in
* I.D. Candidate, University of Maryland School of Law, 2009; M.A., Liberal Arts, Johns Hopkins
University, 2006; B.A., Economics, Johns Hopkins University, 2002.
1. 924 A.2d 816 (Conn. 2007).
2. Id. at 822-25.
3. Id. at 825.
4. See infra Part IV.
5. See infra Part W.A.
6. See infra Part IV.B.
7. See infra Part P.C.
8. Weber v. U.S. Sterling Sec., Inc., No. CV-03-0401100-S, 2004 WL 238268, at '1-2 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Jan. 23, 2004). Suit was filed in the Judicial District of Fairfield. Weber, 924 A.2d at 820.
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October 2002, the Defendants sent him and other class members an unsolicited
advertisement via fax in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
('TCPA").9 The Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, ar-
guing that they did not have sufficient contacts within Connecticut. ° The court
ordered an evidentiary hearing to determine the disputed factual issues concerning
jurisdiction and transferred the case to the Superior Court of Connecticut in the
Judicial District of Stamford/Norwalk." The Stamford/Norwalk court granted the
Defendants' motion to dismiss as to U.S. Sterling Securities, Inc. and U.S. Sterling
Capital Corporation, 2 finding that these New York corporations had no contact
with Connecticut on which to base personal jurisdiction. 3 The Defendants' motion
for summary judgment was also granted as to Shawn Orr, Michelle Orr, and Retail
Relief, LLC."4 Without providing its own analysis or reasoning for granting sum-
mary judgment, the court instead relied on the Defendants' arguments in their
motion for summary judgment and accepted them entirely. 5 The court accepted
the Defendants' argument that Retail Reliefs status as a valid Delaware LLC in
good standing provided complete protection against imposing personal liability on
its individual members under the applicable Delaware statutes. 6 Weber thereafter
appealed the district court's decision to Connecticut's Appellate Court, arguing
that the trial court improperly (1) interpreted and applied Delaware's limited liabil-
ity statute to shield the LLC's individual members from personal liability; (2) deter-
mined that New York law was applicable to the case; and (3) precluded Weber's
9. Id. at *1; 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (2000).
10. Weber, 2004 WL 238268, at *1.
11. id. at *2.
12. Weber v. U.S. Sterling Sec., Inc., No. X05-CV-03-0199155-S, 2005 WL 1094748, at *1 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Apr. 8, 2005), affd in part, rev'd in part, 924 A.2d 816 (Conn. 2007).
13. Id. The fax was allegedly sent between two New York addresses. Id.
14. Weber v. U.S. Sterling Sec., Inc., 924 A.2d 816, 820-21 (Conn. 2007). In effect, the trial court held that
(1) under title 6, section 18-303(a) of the Delaware Code, individual members ofa LLC cannot be held person-
ally liable for their tortious conduct when acting on behalf of the corporation; (2) New York state substantive
law applied to Weber's class action request and that request was precluded by section 901(b) of the New York
Civil Practice Law and Rules; and (3) Weber's individual claim was barred by section 396-aa of the New York
General Business Law. Id. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-303(a) (2005); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (1975); N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 396-aa (McKinney Supp. 2008).
15. Weber, 924 A.2d at 821 n.3. The court agreed with the Defendants' assertions that New York law
applied and, as a result, precluded class action status for Weber's complaint. Motion for Summary Judgment at
2, Weber v. U.S. Sterling Sec., Inc., No. XO5-CV-03-0199155-S, 2005 WL 6075472 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 5,
2005). The Defendants also argued that Weber's complaint failed to plead a cause of action under New York
General Business Law section 396-aa because the alleged unsolicited fax advertisement was not greater than five
pages in length and was not received during the statutorily prohibited time frame of 6:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. Id.
at 3. Because the TCPA specifically states that the Act does not preempt state law, and because Weber's allega-
tions failed to satisfy section 396-aa, the fax advertisement was not in violation of the TCPA. Id.
16. In their motion for summary judgment, the Defendants also argued that (1) while the TCPA provides
a private right of action, it does not preempt state law, and (2) the plaintiff failed to properly serve the LLC.
Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 15, at 1-4.
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personal claim under the TCPA."7 Weber's appeal was transferred to the Supreme
Court of Connecticut.'"
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
When a LLC incorporated in another state is sued in Connecticut, Connecticut
courts must apply the substantive laws of the LLC's state of incorporation'9 and use
Connecticut law on statutory interpretation to discern the meaning and effect of
the other state's substantive laws.2" Claims involving the TCPA implicate principles
of tort law.2' Finally, where the entity in question is a LLC, the court must decide
whether the common law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is implicated, and
if so, whether the veil can be pierced in order to hold LLC members personally
liable.22
A. Connecticut Courts Look to the LLC's State of Incorporation for Application of
the Relevant Substantive Law
Connecticut law provides that the laws of the state in which a foreign LLC is incor-
porated govern the LLC and determine the nature and extent of the liability that
can be attached to LLC members.23 Thus, where the LLC's state of incorporation is
Delaware, the court considers the principles enumerated by Delaware courts gov-
erning the legal responsibilities and liability limits of those LLCs.24 In Delaware,
limited liability companies are incorporated under the Delaware Limited Liability
Company Act ("DLLCA")." "Under Delaware law, a limited liability company
formed under the [DLLCA] is treated for liability purposes like a corporation.26
Delaware courts have long recognized that the individual officers of a corporation
17. Weber, 924 A.2d at 822, 825, 828-29.
18. Id. at 821 n.4. In Connecticut, section 51-199(c) of the General Statutes and section 65-1 of the Rules
of Appellate Procedure allow the Supreme Court to transfer a cause of action from the Appellate Court to itself,
without requiring a particular reason for doing so. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-199(c) (West 2005); CONN. R.
APp. P. 65-1 (2008).
19. See infra Part II.A.
20. See infra Part lI.B.
21. See infra Part II.C.
22. See infra Part I.D.
23. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-222 (West 2005).
24. See infra notes 25-47 and accompanying text.
25. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to 18-1109 (2005). The LLC is a relatively new creation in the
world of business. See Fredric J. Bendremer, Delaware LLCs and Veil Piercing: Limited Liability Has Its Limita-
tions, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 385, 386 (2005). It was created to capture the best characteristics of the
two existing business entities: the corporation and the partnership. See Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. Monsanto
Co., 96 F. Supp. 2d 376, 383 (D. Del. 2000). A limited liability company receives the tax benefits of a partner-
ship and the liability shield afforded a corporation. Id. at 383.
26. Wellman v. Dow Chem. Co., Civ. No. 05-280-SLR, 2007 WL 842084, at *2 (D. Del. Mar. 20, 2007).
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can be held personally liable for the torts they commit, even if those torts are
committed in the officers' official, rather than mere individual, capacities.27
The contraction of the LLC liability shield for actual participation in tortious
conduct is most clearly analyzed and explained in Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp.25 In
Donsco, the defendant corporation created and marketed reproductions of the
plaintiffs mechanical penny banks in alleged violation of unfair competition and
false advertising laws.29 The plaintiff sued both the corporation and its president."
Although the district court held the infringing corporation liable, it declined to
hold the corporate officer liable as the corporation's agent.3 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court's decision with respect to
the officer's personal liability,32 citing case law from several other circuits.3" The
Third Circuit held that corporate officers cannot use a corporation as a shield to
escape liability when they are "actual participant[s] in the tort.""
The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware has since expanded the lia-
bility holding in Donsco to claims beyond unfair competition and false advertising.
In Brandywine Mushroom Co. v. Hockessin Mushroom Products, Inc.,3" the court ap-
plied Donsco's holding to trademark infringement and deceptive trade practices. 6
The defendant corporation enticed one of the plaintiff's employees to divert
purchase orders from the plaintiff to the defendant by claiming that the defendant
was merely a subdivision of the plaintiffs enterprise. 7 The defendant corporation
also violated its contract with the plaintiff when it failed to provide the necessary
amount of mushrooms the plaintiff required to fulfill its orders. 8 The plaintiff sued
the defendant corporation and the corporate officer responsible for the enticement,
27. St. James Recreation, LLC v. Rieger Opportunity Partners, LLC, No. Civ. A. 19346, 2003 WL 22659875,
at "21 (Del. Ch. Nov. 5, 2003); see also Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir. 1978);
Brandywine Mushroom Co. v. Hockessin Mushroom Prods., Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1307, 1311 (D. Del. 1988); T.V.
Spano Bldg. Corp. v. Dep't Natural Res. & Envtl. Control, 628 A.2d 53, 61 (Del. 1993); T.V. Spano Bldg. Corp.
v. Wilson, 584 A.2d 523, 530-31 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990); Stonington Partners, Inc. v. Lernout & Hauspie Speech
Prods., N.V., No. C.A. 18524-NC, 2002 WL 31439767, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 23, 2002); State ex rel. Brady v.
Preferred Florist Network, Inc., 791 A.2d 8, 21-22 (Del. Ch. 2001).
28. 587 F.2d 602. This is not the first Delaware case to address these issues, but it is one of the earliest
cases that effectively synthesizes and summarizes the relevant principles of corporate and agency law in its
reasoning and holding.
29. Id. at 604-05.
30. id. at 603.
31. John Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292, 312 (D. Pa. 1976) (Finding of Fact No. 84).
32. Donsco, 587 F.2d at 608.
33. Id. at 606. See, e.g., Mead Johnson & Co. v. Baby's Formula Serv., Inc., 402 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1968);
Solo Cup Co. v. Paper Mach. Corp., 359 F.2d 754 (7th Cir. 1966); Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st
Cir. 1962); FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 86 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1936), modified on other grounds, 302 U.S. 112
(1937); Hitchcock v. Am. Plate Glass Co., 259 F. 948 (3d Cir. 1919); Steak & Brew, Inc. v. Makins, 177 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 412 (D. Conn. 1973).
34. Donsco, 587 F.2d at 606.
35. 682 F. Supp. 1307 (D. Del. 1988).
36. Id. at 1311-13.
37. id. at 1309.
38. Id.
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as well as the employee who had subsequently left to work for the defendant corpo-
ration. 9 Citing the Third Circuit's decision in Donsco, the district court denied the
corporate officer's motion for summary judgment, finding enough evidence to
support a jury's determination of personal liability.4"
Delaware courts continued the development of Donsco's holding in T.V. Spano
Building Corp. v. Wilson4 by refusing to distinguish between tortious conduct com-
mitted in an individual capacity and tortious conduct committed in an official
capacity.42 In T. V. Spano, the plaintiff corporation improperly disposed of a signifi-
cant amount of waste in several pits while developing a residential neighborhood.43
After the discovery of a methane gas leak in the development, the Department of
Natural Resources and Environmental Control ("DNREC") ordered the plaintiff to
initiate and pay for mitigation and clean-up measures to remove the hazard." The
Environmental Appeals Board sustained the DNREC order with respect to the cor-
poration, but reversed the order's finding of liability for the corporation's presi-
dent.4" The Superior Court of Delaware overruled the Board's reversal, holding that
corporate officers can be liable for tortious conduct "even though they were acting
officially for the corporation in committing the tort."'6 Subsequent Delaware deci-
sions after T.V. Spano have applied similar reasoning, holding corporate officers
personally liable for tortious conduct even when that conduct is committed in the
officers' official capacities for the corporation.
B. Connecticut Applies its Procedural Law to Interpret the Substantive Laws of an
Out-of-State LLC's State of Incorporation
Once the court has identified the applicable substantive laws, it applies Connecticut
procedural law to discern the meaning and effect of the substantive law.48 The
court, guided by statutory provision, 9 must construe the substantive statute in
such a way that gives "effect to the apparent intent of the legislature." '5 If the mean-
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1311.
41. 584 A.2d 523 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990).
42. Id. at 530.
43. Id. at 525.
44. Id. at 525-26.
45. Id. at 526.
46. Id. at 530 (emphasis added) (citing 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1135 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2002)).
47. See St. James Recreation, LLC v. Rieger Opportunity Partners, LLC, No. Civ. A. 19346, 2003 WL
22659875, at *8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 5, 2003); Stonington Partners, Inc. v. Lernout & Hauspie Speech Prods., N.V.,
No. C.A. 18524-NC, 2002 WL 31439767, at *8 n.27 (Del. Ch. Oct. 23, 2002); State ex rel. Brady v. Preferred
Florist Network, Inc., 791 A.2d 8, 21-22 (Del. Ch. 2001).
48. Burton v. Burton, 454 A.2d 1282, 1287 n.8 (Conn. 1983) (citing Broderick v. McGuire, 174 A. 314, 321
(Conn. 1934)).
49. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-2z (West 2007).
50. Kinsey v. Pac. Employers Ins. Co., 891 A.2d 959, 963 (Conn. 2006); see also Cogan v. Chase Manhattan
Auto Fin. Corp., 882 A.2d 597, 601 (Conn. 2005).
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ing of any word in the statute is unclear or subject to multiple plausible interpreta-
tions, and no statutory definition is provided by the legislature, the court must
consult a dictionary to deduce the "commonly approved usage" of the word."'
The court's reliance on Connecticut procedural law in applying the substantive
law of another state is well settled. In Burton v. Burton," the plaintiff sued for an
increase in monthly child support payments from her defendant ex-husband and
sought to modify the original marital dissolution decree issued in New York. 3 The
court, noting that Connecticut law governs procedural issues, 4 adhered to United
States Supreme Court precedent holding that the law of the forum controls all
matters affecting the judicial remedy.5
After resolving any conflict of law issues, Connecticut courts then seek to inter-
pret and apply the relevant substantive or procedural law. 6 In Kinsey v. Pacific
Employers Insurance Co.,57 the defendant insurance company appealed a trial court
judgment affirming an arbitrator's decision in favor of the insured's injured em-
ployee." After determining that the case required statutory construction analysis,
the court stated its primary objective as discovering the meaning of the statute
within the framework of the legislature's intent. 9 The court also noted that, where
the statutory text was ambiguous or its meaning not plain, it would consider evi-
dence outside the text to reach a definition.6'
Building on the Kinsey court's analytical framework, the Supreme Court of Con-
necticut further clarified what other evidence, beyond a statute's plain text, a court
could consider to ascertain a statute's plain meaning.61 In Stone-Krete Construction,
Inc. v. Eder,62 the defendant appealed the trial court's denial of her motion to dis-
charge the plaintiff's mechanic's lien.63 The defendant based her appeal on the
plaintiffs alleged violation of section 49-34 of the General Statutes, arguing that the
plaintiff had failed to meet the requirements outlined in subsection (1)(C).64 Ad-
dressing the statutory meaning issue, the court first cited Kinsey to reaffirm its
51. Stone-Krete Constr., Inc. v. Eder, 911 A.2d 300, 304 (Conn. 2006); see also Chatterjee v. Comm'r of
Revenue Servs., 894 A.2d 919, 924 (Conn. 2006).
52. 454 A.2d 1282.
53. Id. at 1283-84.
54. Id. at 1287 n.8. Accord Broderick v. McGuire, 174 A. 314, 321 (Conn. 1934); New England Fruit &
Produce Co. v. Hines, 116 A. 243, 244 (Conn. 1922); Gonzalez v. Univ. Sys. of N.H., No. 451217, 2005 WL
530806, *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2005).
55. Cent. Vt. R.R. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 511-12 (1915).
56. Kinsey v. Pac. Employers Ins. Co., 891 A.2d 959, 963 (Conn. 2006).
57. 891 A.2d 959.
58. Id. at 960.
59. Id. at 963.
60. Id.; see also Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Fin. Corp., 882 A.2d 597, 601-02 (Conn. 2005).
61. Stone-Krete Constr., Inc. v. Eder, 911 A.2d 300, 304 (Conn. 2006).
62. 911 A.2d 300.
63. Id. at 302.
64. Id. at 303. Section 49-34 of the General Statutes concerns the requirements of recording a mechanic's
lien and providing notice to the owner of the property. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-34 (West 2006).
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objective as ascertaining the meaning of the statute in question." Then, clarifying
Kinsey, the court noted that the proper order of analysis first required considera-
tion of any provided statutory definition,66 absent which, the court should consider
the text's "commonly approved usage" as ascertained from a dictionary.67
C. Claims Brought Under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act Sound in Tort
In 1991, Congress passed the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA")6 The
TCPA proscribes the sending of an unsolicited advertisement to a fax machine by
any person in the United States.69 Under the TCPA, a private right of action exists,
"if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State,"7 ° and a claimant
may sue for an injunction;7 the recovery of any actual monetary damages (or $500
for each violation if that amount is greater than the actual monetary damages);72 or
both.73 A willful or knowing violation of the TCPA can result in treble damages at
the court's discretion.74
While Connecticut courts have not previously decided cases brought under the
TCPA, courts in other jurisdictions have addressed such claims.75 In US Fax Law
Center, Inc. v. IHire, Inc.,76 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had sent over 100
unsolicited fax advertisements to a group of commercial entities, which then as-
signed their rights to the receipt of those advertisements to the plaintiff.77 The U.S.
District Court for the District of Colorado held that claims under the TCPA sound
in tort because they implicate invasion of privacy issues.7
Faced with a similar set of facts, the U.S. District Court for the Central District
of California also determined that TCPA claims are based in tort.79 In J2 Global
Communications, Inc. v. Vision Lab Telecommunications, Inc., ° the plaintiff alleged
65. Stone-Krete, 911 A.2d at 303-04.
66. Id. at 304.
67. Id.
68. Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (as codified in 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2000)).
69. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (2000).
70. Id. § 227(b)(3).
71. Id. § 227(b)(3)(A).
72. Id. § 227(b)(3)(B).
73. Id. § 227(b)(3)(C).
74. Id. § 227(b)(3).
75. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has considered cases involving the TCPA on only two
prior occasions. See Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 436 F.3d 335, 337, 343 (2d Cir. 2006) (distinguishing Foxhall
and holding that federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction with state courts over TCPA claims where jurisdic-
tion is based on diversity, rather than federal question); Foxhall Realty Law Offices v. Telecomms. Premium
Servs., 156 F.3d 432, 434 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that federal courts have no jurisdiction over TCPA claims
because the TCPA gives state courts exclusive jurisdiction over private causes of action).
76. 362 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (D. Colo. 2005).
77. Id. at 1250-51.
78. Id. at 1252.
79. 12 Global Commc'ns, Inc. v. Vision Lab Telecomms., Inc., CV 05-6348 RSWL, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
66865, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 2006).
80. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66865.
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that the defendant sent unsolicited fax communications to the plaintiff and the
plaintiff's customers."' The district court held that the customers' TCPA claims
sounded in tort because they implicated both property and privacy concerns.2
D. The Corporate Veil Liability Shield Can Be Pierced in Certain Circumstances
The "corporate veil" is a legal principle that effectively places a shield around a
parent corporation to protect it against claims of liability for the misconduct or
wrongful action of a subsidiary. 3 Alternatively, the corporate veil is used to shield
individual members and shareholders of a corporation from being held liable for
the corporation's wrongful acts. 4 Generally, the corporate veil's shield against lia-
bility will stand against claims brought by third parties seeking to hold the parent
corporation or shareholders liable.8 " In some situations courts will "pierce" this
corporate veil to impose liability on those parties who would otherwise be pro-
tected in order to rectify fraud and achieve equity. 6
Determining what circumstances call for piercing the corporate veil varies from
one jurisdiction to another.8 7 Connecticut courts will pierce the corporate veil
where a sufficient factual basis exists and equity requires them to do so.88 In Con-
81. Id. at '4-5.
82. Id. at *5-7.
83. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61-63 (1998).
84. See HOK Sport, Inc. v. FC Des Moines, L.C., 495 F.3d 927, 935 (8th Cir. 2007); JOHN E. MOYE, THE
LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 192 (4th ed. 2004).
85. See, e.g., Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United States, 326 U.S. 432, 437 (1946); Servo Kinetics, Inc. v.
Tokyo Precision Instruments Co., 475 F.3d 783, 798 (6th Cir. 2007); Morris v. New York State Dep't of Taxa-
tion & Fin., 623 N.E.2d 1157, 1160 (N.Y. 1993); Wenban Estate, Inc. v. Hewlett, 227 P. 723, 731-32 (Cal. 1924).
See also MOYE, supra note 84, at 193-94.
86. See supra note 85.
87. There is no single comprehensive or exhaustive list of factors under which all courts will pierce the
corporate veil. Compare HOK Sport, 495 F.3d at 936 (applying Iowa law and piercing where the corporate
entity is effectively an intermediary through which fraud can be perpetrated and serves merely as a shell
without a legitimate business purpose) and Servo Kinetics, 475 F.3d at 798 (applying Michigan law and piercing
where the corporate entity is simply an instrumentality through which the parent corporation acts) with Trust
v. Kummerfeld, 153 Fed. App'x 761, 763 (2d Cir. 2005) (applying New York law and piercing where the corpo-
rate entity is completely dominated by the owners in order to commit fraud). For a comprehensive analysis of
each state's methodology for piercing the corporate veil, see STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE
VEIL §§ 2:1 to 2:55 (2004). The analysis for Connecticut and Delaware can be found in §§ 2:7 and 2:8, respec-
tively. There are, however, factors which are common to most jurisdictions: complete control of the corporate
entity such that it has no independent existence, use of the corporate entity to commit fraud or inequity, and
injury resulting from such use of the corporate entity. See, e.g., Corrigan v. U.S. Steel Corp., 478 F.3d 718, 724
(6th Cir. 2007) (applying Ohio law); Hambelton Bros. Lumber Co. v. Balkin Enters., 397 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th
Cir. 2005) (applying Oregon law); Int'l Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Chromas Techs. Canada, Inc., 356 F.3d 731, 736
(7th Cir. 2004) (applying Illinois law); Plastipak Packaging, Inc. v. DePasquale, 75 Fed. App'x 86, 88 (3rd Cir.
2003) (applying Pennsylvania law); Gallinger v. North Star Hosp. Mut. Assurance, Ltd., 64 F.3d 422, 427-28
(8th Cir. 1995) (applying Minnesota law). Generally, the broad factors can be whittled down to "fraud, illegal-
ity, contravention of contract, public wrong, and inequity." 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2002).
88. United Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Progress Builders, Inc., 603 A.2d 1190, 1193-94 (Conn. App. Ct.
1992); see also Skyler Ltd. P'ship v. S.P. Douthett & Co., 557 A.2d 927, 931 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989); Angelo
Tomasso, Inc. v. Armor Constr. & Paving, Inc., 447 A.2d 406, 411, 414 (Conn. 1982).
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necticut, piercing the veil can occur under either of two rules: instrumentality or
identity. 9 To pierce using the instrumentality rule, the plaintiff must prove three
elements: (1) complete control over the corporate entity such that it has "no sepa-
rate mind, will or existence of its own;" (2) commission of a fraud or wrong
through the control; and (3) causation between the control and the alleged injury.9
The identity rule, on the other hand, requires a showing of near-total unity in
interest and ownership, such that the corporate entity has no effective indepen-
dence, and proof that maintaining the separation would "serve only to defeat jus-
tice and equity by permitting the economic entity to escape liability arising out of
an operation conducted by one corporation for the benefit of the wholeenterprise. '
In United Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Progress Builders, Inc.,92 the court ex-
plained that, under Connecticut law, the corporate veil could only be pierced in
exceptional circumstances where the corporate entity was merely used to disguise
fraud or injustice committed by parties behind the entity.93 There, the plaintiff
performed electrical work on a piece of property owned by the wife of the defen-
dant's president, but was not paid.94 The plaintiff then filed suit against the defen-
dant, its president, the president's wife, and a second corporate entity which had
originally owned the property but transferred it to the president's wife while the
plaintiff was performing the electrical work.9" The trial court awarded the plaintiff
compensatory and punitive damages as against the two corporate defendants, but
not against the corporation's president and his wife. 6 Reversing the trial court and
holding the president and his wife liable, the court explained that, when necessary
to promote justice, the corporate veil may be pierced under either the instrumen-
tality or identity tests. 7 The court found sufficient evidence of the president's com-
plete control over the two corporate defendants and use of the corporate entities to
defraud the plaintiff to satisfy the elements of the instrumentality test.98
Similarly, in Falcone v. Night Watchman, Inc.,99 the court explained that corpo-
rate debts are generally not the liability of the corporation's stockholders except
where "the corporate entity has been so controlled and dominated that justice re-
89. United Elec., 603 A.2d at 1194; see also Kregos v. Latest Line, 929 F. Supp. 600, 603 (D. Conn. 1996).
90. United Elec., 603 A.2d at 1194 (quoting Saphir v. Neustadt, 413 A.2d 843, 853 (Conn. 1979)); Falcone
v. Night Watchman, Inc., 526 A.2d 550, 552 n.2 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This rule only applies to cases where there is no express agency relationship. United Elec., 603 A.2d at 1194.
91. United Elec., 603 A.2d at 1194 (quoting Falcone, 526 A.2d at 552 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
92. 603 A.2d 1190.
93. Id. at 1194.
94. Id. at 1192.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1194.
98. Id. at 1195.
99. 526 A.2d 550 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987).
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quires liability to be imposed on the real actor."" In Falcone, a chef in a restaurant
owned by the defendant corporation contracted with the plaintiff wholesale pro-
duce supplier for the provision of fruits and produce.' When payment for the
fruits and produce was not made, the supplier contacted the corporation's sole
stockholder, who orally promised to pay for the produce.'12 The restaurant, how-
ever, went out of business and the stockholder refused to pay the supplier, insisting
that the debt was the sole responsibility of the corporation.0 3 The trial court
pierced the corporate veil under the identity rule, finding that the defendant corpo-
ration lacked its own independent identity and was merely the alter ego of the
stockholder. 4 Finding sufficient evidence to support the trial court's decision, the
appellate court affirmed and noted that the facts indicated "such a unity of interest
and ownership" between the defendant corporation and its sole stockholder that
the corporation "had in effect ceased or never existed."'0 5
III. COURT'S REASONING
In Weber v. U.S. Sterling Securities, Inc., 6 the Supreme Court of Connecticut re-
versed the judgment of the Superior Court and held that (1) title 6, section 18-
303(a) of the Delaware Code does not provide unlimited liability protection to the
individual members of a LLC, and (2) claims under the TCPA sound in tort.'0 7 A
unanimous court, in an opinion authored by Judge Vertefeuille, refused to interpret
Delaware law as providing a complete shield against legal responsibility to LLC
members who perpetuate tortious conduct.'0 8
After describing the parties and reviewing the procedural history of the action,
the court explained the legislative background and purpose behind the TCPA, since
the lawsuit centered on Weber's claim under the Act.0 9 Noting Congress's concern
with consumers' privacy interests vis-A-vis unsolicited telemarketing and advertis-
ing, the court focused on the relevant sections of the Act implicated by Weber's
claim."0 Without Connecticut precedent to rely on, the court looked to the hold-
ings of two extra-jurisdictional courts (in California and Colorado) for the pro-
position that claims brought under the TCPA are tortious in nature."'
100. Id. at 552 (quoting Saphir v. Neustadt, 413 A.2d 843, 853 (1979)).
101. Id. at 551-52.
102. Id. at 552.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 553.
105. Id. at 554.
106. 924 A.2d 816 (Conn. 2007).
107. Id. at 825.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 821.
110. Id.
111. Id. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
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The court first established the judicial backdrop for its holding and reasoning by
reviewing general principles of limited liability companies."' The court then ana-
lyzed which substantive and procedural laws to use in addressing the primary issue
of individual LLC member liability."' Guided by Connecticut statute, the court
determined that, because the defendant LLC was incorporated in Delaware, the
relevant substantive LLC law of Delaware must be applied and that law was found
in title 6, section 18-303(a) of the Delaware Code."4 Drawing from precedent and
Connecticut statute, the court determined that procedural issues, such as statutory
interpretation, must be resolved under Connecticut law."' Judge Vertefeuille then
explained that, when faced with issues of statutory construction and interpretation,
Connecticut courts have a single objective: "to ascertain and give effect to the ap-
parent intent of the legislature.""' 6 Where the intent can be determined from a
"plain and unambiguous" reading of the statute, the court's job is done; extra-
textual evidence is only considered where the reading is ambiguous." 7
With this analytical framework in mind, the court then turned to the text of
section 18-303(a) and, after determining that resolution of the liability issue rested
on the proper meaning of the word "solely," looked for a definition."' Finding
none in the statutory text itself, the court-guided again by Connecticut procedu-
ral law" 9-turned to Webster's dictionary. ° With definition in hand, the court
concluded that section 18-303(a) limited the liability protection afforded to LLC
members by virtue of their membership, and precluded them from being held lia-
ble based only on their status as members of the LLC.' 2 ' As a result, the court
determined that the Delaware statute did not bar personal liability for tortious
conduct if the claim of liability was not based only on membership status. 22 Within
this analysis and discussion, the court briefly returned to the TCPA and, noting its
previous mention of the California and Colorado decisions, agreed that claims
brought under the Act sound in tort.13 Thus, the court held that the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiffs tort
claim. 24
112. Weber, 924 A.2d at 822.
113. Id. at 822-24.
114. Id. at 823.
115. Id. at 823 n.5 (citing Burton v. Burton, 454 A.2d 1282, 1287 n.8 (Conn. 1983)).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 823-24.
119. The court noted that, when the statutory text fails to provide definitions for terms, Connecticut
courts, pursuant to section 1-1(a) of the General Statutes, must apply the "commonly approved usage" of the
terms as determined by dictionary definition. Id. at 824; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-1(a) (West 2007).
120. Weber, 924 A.2d at 824. According to the court, Webster's defines solely as "to the exclusion of alter-
nate or competing things." Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2168 (2002)).
121. Id. at 824.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 825.
124. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
In Weber v. U.S. Sterling Securities,125 the court held that members of a limited
liability company could be individually liable for their personal tortious conduct,
even if that conduct was performed in furtherance of the LLC's business.'26 The
court's holding logically resulted from its proper interpretation and application of
Delaware corporate law, coupled with recognition of the liability shield's contrac-
tion by Delaware courts.'27 The court properly opted for an interpretation that
maintained consistency with holdings in other jurisdictions, and with basic princi-
ples of agency and corporation law. 2 This consistency, coupled with the court's
implicit refusal to apply the common law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil,
was appropriate to the maintenance of judicial cohesion and uniformity.'29 Criti-
cisms of the reasoning used by the Weber court are not supported by the case law
and ignore basic principles of statutory construction. 3 °
A. The Court's Analysis is Properly Framed
The court's analytical framework was properly constructed on its identification of
the applicable Delaware law and its interpretation of that law subject to Connecti-
cut law. 3' Connecticut law clearly directed the court to locate and interpret the
relevant Delaware law governing the operation and management of limited liability
companies.'32 Connecticut law then clearly directed the court to apply specific pro-
cedural standards to the statutory interpretation of Delaware's statute.' Under the
facts presented, the court could not have constructed any other plausible analytical
framework within which to analyze the case; doing so would have violated clear
and unchallenged Connecticut law. More to the point, courts must adhere to the
applicable procedural rules when considering and deciding a case; failure to do so
almost certainly invites reversal by an appellate court.'i Nothing in the court's
analysis or reasoning indicates a departure from the well-established rules gov-
erning the applicability of relevant statutory provisions and the procedural frame-
work within which those statutes must be considered.'35 The court's analytical
framework, therefore, is the only rational structure within which this case could
have been adjudicated.
125. 924 A.2d 816.
126. Id. at 824-25.
127. See infra Part [V.A.
128. See infra Part IV.B.
129. See infra Part IV.C.
130. See infra Part IV.D.
131. See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
132. See supra Part II.A.
133. See supra Part II.B.
134. See, e.g., In re Smythe, 592 N.W.2d 628, 633 (Wis. 1999). But see State v. Headman, 802 A.2d 842,
842-44 (Conn. 2002).
135. See Weber v. U.S. Sterling Sec., Inc., 924 A.2d 816, 822-25 (Conn. 2007).
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The court's analytical framework is also consistent with that applied by other
courts. 3 6 Most relevant perhaps is that of Delaware, since the underlying statute
came from that state. Delaware courts must first look to the plain words of the
statute to ascertain its meaning; where there is ambiguity, the courts must use the
applicable methods of statutory interpretation to discern the meaning. 7 A very
similar analytical methodology is used in other jurisdictions as well, including
North Carolina,'38 Michigan,'39 and Wyoming, 4 ° among others.'4'
B. The Court's Analysis is Consistent With Other Courts' Interpretations of
Similar Statutes and With Agency and Corporation Law Principles
Although no Delaware court had previously addressed the precise issue before the
Weber court, prior Delaware case law concerning both corporations and LLCs
clearly supports the Weber court's holding. 4' Indeed, at least one Delaware court
has arrived at the same interpretation of section 18-303(a) as the Weber court
did-albeit under a different set of facts-that the word "solely" does not shield
LLC members from personal liability when that liability is imposed for reasons
136. See infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
137. See Coastal Barge Corp. v. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd., 492 A.2d 1242, 1246--47 (Del. 1985);
Hibbert v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 457 A.2d 339, 343 (Del. 1983).
138. See Polaroid Corp. v. Offerman, 507 S.E.2d 284, 290 (N.C. 1998) (the underlying purpose ofstatutory
construction is to accomplish the legislature's intent; using words' plain meaning is the starting point); Lafay-
ette Transp. Serv., Inc. v. County of Robeson, 196 S.E.2d 770, 774 (N.C. 1973) (courts will presume that
statutory words are defined according to ordinary speech).
139. See Koontz v. Ameritech Servs., 645 N.W.2d 34, 39 (Mich. 2002) (courts will not interpret statutory
text that is unambiguous); Popma v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 521 N.W.2d 831, 836 (Mich. 1994) (courts use
dictionaries to determine the ordinary meaning of text that lacks a statutory definition).
140. See Kunkle v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 109 P.3d 887, 890 (Wyo. 2005) (courts
must determine whether statutory text is clear or ambiguous and, if unambiguous, may not substitute their
own interpretation for the legislature's intent); Cooper v. Town of Pinedale, I P.3d 1197, 1203 (Wyo. 2000)
(courts must look to extra-textual sources when legislative intent is unclear and statutory definitions are
lacking).
141. See, e.g., King v. Ochoa, No. 08-257, 2008 WL 2286642, at *2-3 (Ark. June 5, 2008); Morris v. Good-
win, 185 P.3d 777, 779-80 (Colo. 2008); King Drugs, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 643, 645-46 (Ky.
2008); Ultsch v. Ill. Mun. Ret. Fund, 874 N.E.2d 1, 8-9 (Il. 2007); City of Bessemer v. McClain, 957 So. 2d
1061, 1074-75 (Ala. 2006); City of Skagway v. Robertson, 143 P.3d 965, 968 (Alaska 2006); S.B. Beach Props. v.
Berti, 138 P.3d 713, 716 (Cal. 2006); State ex rel. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Hayden, 115 P.3d 116, 117-18 (Ariz.
2005); Hassan v. Mercy Am. River Hosp., 74 P.3d 726, 729 (Cal. 2003).
142. See supra notes 28-47 and accompanying text.
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other than LLC membership.'43 Weber's interpretation also has wide-reaching sup-
port among other jurisdictions interpreting statutes similar to Delaware's.144
A California court' 45 has held that a local statute'46 containing nearly identical
language to section 18-303(a) does not shield LLC members from liability arising
out of their participation in tortious acts, even when those acts are performed in
their membership role.'47 Likewise, the Supreme Court of Iowa has been willing to
impose liability on LLC members for tortious conduct committed in furtherance of
the LLC's business under a similar statute. 4 ' The Iowa court provided a better
framework for future cases revolving around this issue by summarizing the applica-
143. See Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Handy, No. 1973-S, 2000 WL 364199, at *3-4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 2000).
In Handy, the allegedly tortious acts were committed prior to the formation of the LLC, leading the chancery
court to conclude that the defendants were thus not being sued "solely" for their membership in the LLC. Id. at
*5. Although the facts of Handy differ from those in Weber, the Handy court's interpretation of section 18-
303(a) did not rest on the timing of the tortious conduct. Rather, the chancery court simply concluded that the
use of the word "solely" did not preclude other situations, outside of LLC membership, in which liability could
be imposed. Id. at *3. The chancery court determined that, based on the timing of the allegedly tortious
conduct, the defendants could not possibly have been sued "solely" as a result of their membership in the LLC.
Id. at *5.
144. See, e.g., Equipoise PM LLC v. Int'l Truck & Engine Corp., No. 05 C 6008, 2007 WL 2228621, at *10
(N.D. 111. June 5, 2006). The Equipoise court specifically cited Weber for its interpretation of section 18-303(a).
Id.; see also 2 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI, JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, MARTIN I. LUBAROFF & PAUL M. ALTMAN, BALOTTI
AND FINKELSTEIN's DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 20.7 (2007); Practis-
ing Law Institute, Organization and Operation of the Limited Liability Company: Substantive Issues, 937 PLI/
Corp. 149, 191 (1996).
145. People v. Pac. Landmark, LLC, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 193 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
146. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17158(a) (West 2006). The statute reads:
No person who is a manager or officer or both a manager and officer of a limited liability company
shall be personally liable under any judgment of a court, or in any other manner, for any debt,
obligation, or liability of the limited liability company, whether that liability or obligation arises in
contract, tort, or otherwise, solely by reason of being a manager or officer or both a manager and
officer of the limited liability company.
Id.
147. Pac. Landmark, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 199.
148. Estate of Countryman v. Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 679 N.W.2d 598, 603-04 (Iowa 2004). The Iowa statute
reads:
1. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter or by written agreement of a member, a member or
manager of a limited liability company is not personally liable solely by reason of being a member or
manager of the limited liability company under any judgment, or in any other manner, for any debt,
obligation, or liability of the limited liability company, whether that liability or obligation arises in
contract, tort, or otherwise.
2. A member of a limited liability company is personally liable under a judgment or for any debt,
obligation, or liability of the limited liability company, whether that liability or obligation arises in
contract, tort, or otherwise, under the same or similar circumstances and to the same extent as a
shareholder of a corporation may be personally liable for any debt, obligation, or liability of the
corporation, except that the failure to hold meetings of members or managers or the failure to ob-
serve formalities pertaining to the calling or conduct of meetings shall not be considered a factor
tending to establish that the members have personal liability for any debt, obligation, or liability of
the limited liability company.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.603 (West 1999).
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ble statute and explicitly noting that personal participation in tortious conduct
creates member liability as a matter of law.'49
While the Weber court's opinion does not specifically address agency principles
and quickly glosses over basic concepts of corporation law, its decision is firmly
rooted in long-standing theories of both. Under agency law, agents who commit a
tort are not shielded from liability simply because they were acting under the au-
thority of a principal.' Under corporation law, a similar principle applies.'' Both
standards reflect the generally-accepted proposition that one cannot escape liability
for tortious conduct by hiding behind another legal entity.5 2
These principles are further reflected in Delaware case law. In Ayers v. Quillen,5 '
a dog owner boarded her dogs at the defendant's kennel, where they were attacked
by other dogs being housed at the kennel.5 4 The dog owner sued both the kennel
corporation and the owner of the kennel.' 5 The court considered agency law, cor-
porate law, and the purpose behind the limited liability doctrine to determine
whether the individual owner was protected from liability because he was acting on
behalf of the kennel corporation.' The court held that, where the plaintiff dog
owner could prove that the corporate officer or agent actually participated in the
tort, the corporate entity did not provide protection from liability for the kennel
owner.
7
Connecticut courts have also used agency and corporate law principles to attach
personal liability on corporate members. In Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC,15 a
local commission and its enforcement officer sued the local airport's manager, an
independent contractor corporation, for violating local regulations requiring a per-
mit before cutting down trees and removing vegetation."' The court considered,
among other issues, whether the defendant corporation's sole member could be
held individually liable for the corporation's violation of the regulations. 6 ° After
reviewing what it termed "black letter law" regarding individual member liability
149. Countryman, 679 N.W.2d at 603.
150. See Ayers v. Quillen, No. Civ. A. 03C-02-004-RFS, 2004 WL 1965866, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. June 30,
2004). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.01 (2006) (relating that an agent is personally liable for
his tortious conduct even if his action is committed on behalf of his principal).
151. See Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, 881 A.2d 937, 962 (Conn. 2005); see also 3A WILLIAM MEADE
FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1135 (perm. ed., rev. vol.
2002) (recognizing that individuals are personally liable for their tortious conduct, whether or not they were
acting under the direction of a principal or in their official capacities, and personal liability can attach without
piercing the corporate veil).
152. See infra notes 153-61 and accompanying text.
153. 2004 WL 1965866, -1.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 12.
157. Id. at *2-4.
158. 881 A.2d 937 (Conn. 2005).
159. Id. at 943-44.
160. Id. at 961-62.
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for tortious conduct, the court affirmed the trial court's finding of individual liabil-
ity for the defendant corporation's sole member because the member had directed
that the tortious conduct be committed.' 6'
C. The Court's Holding Implicitly Avoids Piercing the Corporate Veil and
Maintains Judicial Uniformity
The Connecticut equivalent to section 18-303(a) is similar to the Delaware statute
and also includes the word "solely" in the same context. 62 Interestingly, until the
Weber decision, Connecticut courts did not employ a statutory interpretation anal-
ysis to hold LLC members personally liable for tortious conduct, but instead used
the common law principle of piercing the corporate veil to impose personal liabil-
ity.'63 Courts generally use the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil to remove the
shield of liability protection provided by the corporate legal entity and impose di-
rect liability on the corporation's officers and directors. 64 When the corporate veil
is pierced, liability "skips" the corporate entity and attaches directly onto the indi-
viduals behind the corporation. In contrast, using agency and corporate law instead
of piercing the corporate veil means that liability is attached to both the corporate
entity and the individual(s) behind the corporation. 6
As evidenced by the Weber court, use of the piercing the corporate veil doctrine
is made obsolete by using statutory interpretation to reach the same conclusion, a
result that seems preferable. 66 In order to impose liability on the LLC members,
the court had to choose between veil piercing and statutory interpretation, because
no other legal tools exist to get around the shield against liability created by the
LLC. The court's decision to use statutory interpretation was an implicit rejection
of the veil piercing doctrine, although it might have served the court better to be
more explicit in explaining its rejection. 67 The corporate veil doctrine is a cumber-
161. Id. at 962. The Ventres court said, "it is black letter law that an officer of a corporation who commits a
tort is personally liable to the victim regardless of whether the corporation itself is liable." Id. (quoting Kilduff
v. Adams, Inc., 593 A.2d 478, 488 (Conn. 1991)).
162. See section 34-133(a) of the Connecticut General Statutes, which states in relevant part, "a person who
is a member or manager of a limited liability company is not liable, solely by reason of being a member or
manager, under a judgment, decree or order of a court, or in any other manner, for a debt, obligation or
liability of the limited liability company, whether arising in contract, tort or otherwise or for the acts or
omissions of any other member, manager, agent or employee of the limited liability company." CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 34-133(a) (West 2005).
163. See, e.g., Bastan v. RJM & Assocs., LLC, No. CV99 0593189 S, 2001 WL 1006661, at *I (Conn. Super.
Ct. June 4, 2001); see also Robert B. Thompson, The Limits of Liability in the New Limited Liability Entities, 32
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 16, 19-20 (1997); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing, 2005 U. ILL. L.
REV. 77, 83 (2005).
164. See supra Part II.D.
165. Ventres, 881 A.2d at 962 ("[A] director or officer who commits the tort or who directs the tortious act
done, or participates or operates therein, is liable to third persons injured thereby, even though liability may
also attach to the corporation for the tort." (quoting 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1629 (2004))).
166. See Bainbridge, supra note 163, at 83.
167. See, e.g., Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Handy, No. 1973-S, 2000 WL 364199, at *5 (Del. Ch. Mar. 15,
2000).
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some judicial tool to wield, requiring a substantial fact-based inquiry and often
subjective review of a corporation's organization and conduct, the intentions and
purposes behind the conduct of members and/or officers, and whether, in fact, the
corporate entity's existence is genuine or merely designed to allow its members/
officers to perpetrate fraud.6 ' Because a court's consideration will likely be subjec-
tive in nature, its decision may be subject to significant criticism or even reversal on
appeal.'69 While the use of statutory interpretation is also imperfect, the analytical
process seems less time-consuming, presents less opportunities for subjective con-
clusions, and leaves less room for criticism or reversal. Rather than wrestling with a
subjective list of factors that can vary across jurisdictions, 7 ° the court can look
more objectively at legislative intent, common usage, and dictionary definitions.''
A piercing the corporate veil analysis, aside from being inappropriate under the
facts of this case,' 72 may have required a different conclusion than that which the
court reached,'73 leading to tension between principles of statutory interpretation,
agency law, and corporation law on the one hand, and veil-piercing doctrine on the
other. By holding as it did, the Weber court maintains uniformity and consistency
in the law, avoids a likely challenge and possible reversal, and preserves the limited
liability model in the way it was intended.'74
D. Criticism of Weber's Reasoning is Unwarranted and Cannot be Supported
At least two authors suggested previously that the reasoning underlying the Weber
court's holding is incorrect with respect to section 18-303(a).'75 David L. Cohen
argued that the statutory language of section 18-303(a) only permits two possible
methods for the imposition of personal liability on LLC members: contractual or
common law.'76 He also argued that, because Delaware courts traditionally read
acts narrowly in deference to the legislature, the courts would hesitate to impose
168. See United Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Progress Builders, Inc., 603 A.2d 1190, 1192-95 (Conn. App. Ct.
1992).
169. See Bainbridge, supra note 163, at 78. Bainbridge argues that the use of the piercing doctrine is "rare,
unprincipled, and arbitrary," and is therefore likely to produce inconsistent results that create uncertainty and
unpredictability. Id.; see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,
52 U. Cm. L. REV. 89, 89 (1985); Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
170. See supra Part lI.D.
171. See supra Part II.B.
172. See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
173. Since the court did not employ, or even discuss, such an analysis, how it might have found as to the
various piercing factors is pure speculation. It is enough to note, though, that the possibility of a different
result-and the resulting legal and judicial tension-would have been a risk for the court.
174. Based on the agency and corporation law principles already cited, it is clear that limited liability corpo-
rations are entitled to certain protections against general liability, but not privy to the blanket shield that some
commentators have proposed and that the defendants seemed to expect.
175. See infra notes 176-90 and accompanying text.
176. David L. Cohen, Theories of the Corporation and the Limited Liability Company: How Should Courts and
Legislatures Articulate Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility and Securities Regulation for the Limited
Liability Company?, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 427, 476 (1998).
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liability under the common law.'77 Under his theory, the Weber court's decision
would be viewed as erroneous by Delaware courts. However, Cohen's argument is
based primarily on dicta from a 1996 decision by the Chancery Court of Delaware
regarding the use of formality in statutory construction.' 8 In addition, Cohen sug-
gests that in some situations outside the contract, LLC members will have to be
held liable for their conduct.'79 The persuasiveness of Cohen's proposition is lack-
ing, partly from the lack of supporting authority, but more importantly from the
evidence of the more recent judicial decisions in Weber and Equipoise PM LLC v.
Int'l Truck & Engine Corp.' ° Interestingly, the Weber court used statutory construc-
tion (as granted by the legislature)'8 ' to impose liability-it did not rely on either
contractual or common law theories advanced by Cohen as the only ways to im-
pose liability under section 18-303(a).
Fredric J. Bendremer put forth an even more forceful proposition: section 18-
303(a) protects LLC members from any liability arising out of the LLC's activi-
ties.'82 In effect, Bendremer argued that the LLC as a corporate entity provides
unlimited and unqualified liability protection to its members, without exception. 3
He interpreted section 18-303(a) to mean that all contractual or tortious obliga-
tions are the sole responsibility of the LLC.' 4 As a result, LLC members "are fully
insulated against personal liability.""'5 In support of his argument, Bendremer cited
a 2000 decision by the Chancery Court of Delaware8 6 where the court imposed
liability on LLC members because they were being sued not solely due to their
membership status since the allegedly wrongful acts occurred prior to the LLC's
formation.'87 Based on his interpretation of section 18-303(a), he concluded that
the type of reasoning and holding reached by the Weber court would be "neither
candid nor legally sound."'8 8 Bendremer's strict and narrow interpretation of the
statute is directly contradicted by Cohen's more flexible interpretation.' 9 Ben-
dremer's interpretation also fails to consider, or offer a strong argument that re-
jects, a basic statutory interpretation analysis such as that used by the Weber
court. 19
177. Id. at 477-78.
178. Id. at 477. Cohen cites Uni-Marts, Inc. v. Stein, CIV A. Nos. 14713, 14893, 1996 WL 466961, at *9 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 9, 1996).
179. Cohen, supra note 176, at 492.
180. No. 05 C 6008, 2007 WL 2228621 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 2006).
181. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-1(a), 1-2z (West 2007).
182. Bendremer, supra note 25, at 387-88.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 394.
185. Id. at 395.
186. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Handy, No. 1973-S, 2000 WL 364199, *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 2000).
187. Id. at *4.
188. Bendremer, supra note 25, at 403.
189. Compare Cohen, supra note 176, at 476 with Bendremer, supra note 25, at 387-88, 394-95.
190. See supra notes 115-24 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
In Weber v. U.S. Sterling Securities, Inc.,'91 the Supreme Court of Connecticut prop-
erly held members of a Delaware LLC personally liable for tortious conduct com-
mitted in furtherance of the LLC's business.'92 The court clearly and carefully
adhered to the applicable procedural rules that framed its statutory interpretation
of Delaware LLC law.' The court's understanding of Delaware's law resulted in a
holding that is consistent with, and supported by, the interpretations of similar
statutes in other jurisdictions.'94 As a result, the court was able to avoid a compli-
cated piercing the corporate veil analysis.'
191. 924 A.2d 816 (Conn. 2007).
192. Id. at 825.
193. See supra Part IV.A.
194. See supra Part IV.B.
195. See supra Part IV.C.
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